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CHINA: ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS 
George Ernest Morrison went to China without any knowledge of the 
Chinese language and knowing little about Chinese history and 
institutions. He exhibited extraordinary self-confidence and courage, 
some might add recklessness, throughout his life and travels in China. 
We can be glad he did. Morrison's writings became the medium through 
which many in the West saw more of the humanity of China in the late 
nineteenth century. His powers to observe and record sympathetically 
many details of the human condition in, for him and us, an unusual 
setting, are apparent to readers today. 
Some aspects of his view of Chinese humanity mark him as a man 
comfortable with the prevailing British attitudes of the Age of 
Imperialism. Morrison became a hero of the imperialist powers when the 
Peking legations were under seige during the Boxer Rebellion: in the 
words of an admiring survivor, 'as dirty, happy and healthy a hero as 
one could find anywhere'.* And yet he was irreverent about the faith 
and institutions of imperialism in China. Who can ever forget his matter-
of-fact indictment of the missionary in China: the missionary knew that 
only those who had heard and rejected the faith were damned; he knew 
from experience that few in China who heard the Gospel would accept 
the faith; and he thus knowingly persisted in sending countless millions 
to the fires of Hell. 
I thought it appropriate to draw my topic from a set of problems 
left over from the Morrison era of imperialism, and of great 
contemporary importance to China and the rest of the world, including 
Australia. My subject is the interwoven destinies of three parts of China 
that are now administered separately: mainland China, Hong Kong, and 
Taiwan. It should really be four, but the fate of Macau is being settled 
without much excitement, incidental to the larger forces working on the 
history of Hong Kong. Constitutional evolution in Macau has its own 
* See reference to contemporary quotation in Peter Fleming, The 
Siege at Peking (Oxford University Press, Hong Kong, 1983), 
p.160. 
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character and importance, but I will not make a long story longer by 
including it in this lecture. 
One and a half centuries ago, Hong Kong and Taiwan were integral 
parts of China's Qing Empire, then by far the largest economic and 
political entity on Earth. That was before aggressively successful 
industrial capitalism in the West and Japan had played their parts in the 
undermining of the ancient order in China. 
Hong Kong entered British administration in three parts. The island 
was a prize of the First Opium War in 1842. It had been identified, with 
brilliant prescience, by the British and other buccaneer traders who were 
working the South China Coast as an excellent base for the economic 
penetration of Qing China. The mainland peninsula of Kowloon, facing 
the island, was forced from China twenty years later. And then in 1898, 
during times of turmoil in Qing China's relations with the outside world, 
the Chinese government leased to Britain for ninety-nine years the New 
Territories, inland from Kowloon. 
The New Territories afterthought of Britain's colonization of Hong 
Kong was to play a pivotal role in the ultimate resolution of the 
constitutional fate of Kong Kong. By the last quarter of the twentieth 
century, Hong Kong, now a great industrial as well as commercial 
metropolis, had grown so far into the New Territories that its separate 
existence was not contemplated seriously by the British authorities or by 
Hong Kong's business leadership. The end of the New Territories lease 
in 1997 was accepted as a crucial date for establishing a new 
constitutional basis for the administration of Hong Kong island and 
Kowloon as well. 
Taiwan, which under the Qing dynasty was administered as part of 
Fujian Province.was ceded to Japan in 1895, following Japanese military 
victories. Japan's rule ended with its defeat in the Second World War. 
The United Nations accepted Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan, and 
after the surrender this was recognised by the defeated powers. Only 
four years later, Taiwan became the place of retreat of the Kuomintang 
after the Communist victory on the mainland. Ever since, the 
Kuomintang administration in Taiwan has shared with the Communists 
in Beijing a commitment to eventual reunification. 
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This separation of China into three parts is the setting for a major 
act in Chinese history: the attempt by the People's Republic of China to 
end these separations of the age of imperialism in a manner that does not 
compromise modernization and China's opening to the outside world. It 
is happening now and in this way because of the confluence of three 
inter-related historical trends: the development of confidence within the 
People's Republic in open policies to the rest of the world; the success 
of and the economic pressures unleashed by internationally oriented 
economic policies in Hong Kong, Taiwan and now mainland China; and 
the realignment of Sino-American relations in the context of superpower 
competition, symbolized by the United States' recognition of the 
People's Republic as the legal government of one China one decade ago. 
How this act is played is of decisive importance to six million people in 
Hong Kong and nineteen million in Taiwan, but not only to them. It is 
centrally important to the success of the Chinese Communist Party's 
ambitious programme of modernization. It is of no small importance to 
stability and peace on a world scale. 
The Economic Integration of Hong Kong and the Mainland 
Late last year I travelled by car from Hong Kong, across the border 
through Shenzhen to Guangzhou, the old Canton. I was one of about 
twenty million who that year crossed what is now one of the world's 
busiest border points. 
In Shenzhen, huddled against the border, you now see a mini-Hong 
Kong - a forest of high rise buildings; a million people living at a 
material standard much higher than elsewhere in the People's Republic 
of China. 
Shenzhen is bursting at the seams. Its industrial areas are filled 
with activity, mostly representing joint ventures with Hong Kong 
enterprises, exporting much of their output to or through Hong Kong. 
Shenzhen's exports last year were worth one billion US dollars, having 
roughly doubled in each of the preceding two years. At first Hong Kong 
enterprises had sent over the border only the most simple and labour-
intensive processes. Now, with Hong Kong's labour force and industrial 
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infrastructure tautly stretched, Shenzhen is finding a place for itself a 
few rungs up the ladder in the international division of labour. 
All this activity took me by surprise. I had last visited Shenzhen in 
late 1985. Then I had been impressed mainly by the huge investment in 
industrial and social infrastructure. As an economist, I had been 
sceptical about whether this investment would be utilized quickly 
enough to pay its way. 
The Special Economic Zone of Shenzhen had been established a 
few years before, at the site of a sleepy village, as a place to experiment 
with capitalist forms of economic organization, free trade and low 
taxation. One of its roles was to facilitate the expansion of economic 
links with Hong Kong. By late 1987, the judgement of the Chinese 
visionaries of 1983 had been proven more sound than that of the foreign 
sceptic of 1985. 
Travelling beyond the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, with its 
separate customs arrangements, you encounter a fence, like a second 
border. In Baoan County, hard against the Shenzhen fence, there is 
another island of intense industrial activity. Enterprises, usually linked 
to Hong Kong by ownership and management ties, use labour that is 
more abundant and cheaper than in Shenzhen to mass-produce and 
assemble components for more sophisticated manufacture in Shenzhen 
and Hong Kong. 
Moving away from the clusters on the second border, the process 
of economic specialization continues, based on simpler processes and 
yet more abundant and cheaper labour. Through the villages of Baoan 
County, some manufacture is put out to cottage industry, and ultimately 
linked to an international division of labour through Hong Kong. 
You soon realize you are entering the economic influence of 
another large city, a teaming, vibrant city, almost as populous as Hong 
Kong, and intimately connected to the neighbouring metropolis by the 
overlapping of radio and television reception, by kinship ties and the 
constant movement of people, and by a dense web of business 
connections. Guangzhou is the major industrial centre as well as the 
political capital of Guangdong Province, which the powerful momentum 
of export-oriented industrial growth over recent years has made China's 
premier export province. 
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The drive from Hong Kong to Guangzhou reveals five different 
styles of economic organization, five different levels of material living, 
and nearly as many sets of rules about the movement of people and 
capital. In many ways, that initial step from Hong Kong to Shenzhen is 
no larger than the other steps along the way. Many economic systems 
are operating alongside each other within modem China. 
I was told a year ago that Hong Kong linked enterprises were 
employing one million workers in manufacturing activities in 
Guangdong Province - either in joint ventures or in co-production 
financed from Hong Kong. This is as many as are employed in 
manufacturing in Hong Kong itself. 
One of the many fears expressed in Hong Kong about the future 
under Chinese sovereignty is that China may seek to supplant the role of 
Hong Kong in China's trade and development through the strengthening 
of cities on the mainland - variously, Shanghai or new cities such as 
Shenzhen. But Hong Kong need not fear. The British buccaneers of the 
1840s had chosen well their base for trade with China, at the best natural 
deepwater port on the South China coast. These natural advantages have 
been enhanced by the building of a huge, efficient physical and business 
infrastructure uniquely linked to the international economy. 
The influx of capital and skills after 1949 widened Hong Kong's 
links of kinship and language up the coast to Zhejiang and Shanghai. 
The economic value of these assets had increased greatly over the past 
decade, as China's modernization under the new open policies has 
gained momentum. 
The Sino-British Agreement of late 1984 has diminished 
inhibitions in the People's Republic about making full use of Hong 
Kong's advantages. Elsewhere I have described the effects on the Hong 
Kor.1g economy of this easier interaction with the Chinese mainland as 
being comparable to the effects on New York of the opening of the 
railroads in the nineteenth century, or, more appropriately in Australia's 
bicentennial year, to the effects on Sydney of the crossing of the Blue 
Mountains.* 
* Address as Australian Ambassador to China, to Australian 
Chamber of Commerce, Hong Kong, 26 February 1988. 
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The past couple of years have been the most prosperous and 
buoyant in the brilliant economic history of Hong Kong. Real output of 
goods and services increased by 14 per cent. The parts of the Hong Kong 
economy which expanded most rapidly were those geared to providing 
trading, financial communications and other services to China. 
During the year, the real value of total merchandise trade grew by 
one-third. Re-exports expanded almost by half, and domestic exports 
almost by one-quarter. Trade with China was the most dynamic 
component of trade. Domestic exports to China increased by over half, 
and re-exports by a similar proportion. The volume of total imports from 
China increased by over two fifths. China supplied one-third of total 
Hong Kong imports and absorbed one-quarter of total Hong Kong 
exports. Re-exports to and from China expanded more rapidly than any 
other component of trade, by 60 per cent, accounting for more than three 
quarters of the total entrepot trade. 
This powerful reassertion of Hong Kong's entrepot role for the 
mainland has continued in 1988. Over the first four months of this year, 
re-exports to and from the mainland expanded by a further 44 per cent. 
In early 1988 the value of the entrepot trade exceeded domestic exports 
for the first time since Hong Kong became a major producer of 
manufactured goods in its own right some decades ago. 
By late last year, Hong Kong, like Shenzhen, was bursting with 
growth as it strove to meet the rising demands of economic relations 
with the mainland. Kwai Chung became the busiest container port in the 
world. Congestion at the Kai Tak Airport caused long delays, with 
Taiwan visitors, many of them headed into China, becoming the largest 
group. Queues of lorries lengthened at the border crossings. 
Unemployment fell to the lowest levels ever recorded. Real wages rose 
strongly. Construction wage rates rose by 30 per cent in nominal terms 
and 22 per cent in real terms between late 1986 and late 1987. 
Construction and manufacturing enterprises reported desperate shortages 
of labour, and employers called for the loosening of restrictions on 
immigration. 
The Hong Kong authorities resisted pressures to increase the rate 
of immigration. The intake from the mainland was held at the 
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established level, which had been contributing about 0.5 per cent per 
annum to the Hong Kong population. 
Inflationary pressure deriving from labour scarcity and rising real 
wages was alleviated considerably by the movement across the border 
into Guangdong Province of many labour-intensive manufacturing 
processes, a phenomenon that came to be known as outward processing. 
A large part of the strong growth in domestic merchandise exports to 
China represented textile, electronic, watch, toy and other components 
for further manufacture and assembly. A large part of the growth in the 
return trade to Hong Kong represented later stages in these processes. 
This movement in response to labour shortages and inflationary 
pressures in Hong Kong was, of course, the other side of the coin to the 
export-oriented industrial boom in Shenzhen, Baoan and Guangzhou. 
Hong Kong's role in the open door policies of China extends well 
beyond Guangdong Province. There is an important sense in which the 
open policies in China have represented first of all an opening to 
integration with Hong Kong. Two thirds of the joint ventures with 
external capital under the open policies have involved Hong Kong 
partners. In recent years, the greater part of the huge export growth of 
China has been to or through Hong Kong. 
Mainland enterprises have also become major participants in the 
Hong Kong economy. Over recent years, the conglomerate China 
Resources, has been investing in Hong Kong at the rate of US$100 
million per annum, and at a similar rate back into the mainland from a 
Hong Kong base. Investments have been made in a wide range of 
construction and manufacturing activities. The China International Trust 
and Investment Corporation has in a short time become a major player in 
Hong Kong civil aviation, banking and real estate. Many mainland 
businesses were busy purchasing Hong Kong equities in the aftermath of 
last October's Stock Market crash and its mismanagement by the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange. 
Even before the recent explosive growth of economic relations 
with the People's Republic, several decades of strong economic growth 
had introduced powerful pressures for structural change towards 
stronger specialization in higher value activities, requiring higher skills 
and more capital. The strengthening educational standing and skills of 
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the Hong Kong population supported this industrial transformation. The 
combination of the increasingly complementary resource base of the 
mainland, with its huge abundance of labour, and the Chinese 
Communist Party's commitment to reform and opening to the outside 
world, has created an historic opportunity for Hong Kong to employ 
more of its skills and capital in the high-value activities that it is best 
able to perform - the provision of highly sophisticated business, 
transport and communications services linking China to the outside 
world. Recent political developments have further facilitated the process 
of re-specialization, contributing to unprecedented prosperity on both 
sides of the border. 
The economic conditions are now present for a similarly 
productive re-specialization in production and trade across the Taiwan 
Straits. We are now seeing the beginning of this economic integration. 
The realization of the potential benefits from increased economic 
interaction between Taiwan and the mainland is closely linked to the 
development of political relations across the Straits. Political and 
economic forces are interacting in complex ways, which will be strongly 
influenced by perceptions of the success of constitutional evolution in 
Hong Kong. 
Political Integration: One Country, Two Systems 
The Chinese Civil War has never ended, according to the contestants on 
the two sides of the Straits. For three decades there was not much 
surface evidence of change in relations between them. Each spoke of 
'liberating' the territory held by the other. The People's Liberation Army 
periodically fired big guns from the Fujian coast, and Kuomintang forces 
responded in kind. 
There has never been any chance of early military victory by either 
side since the United States committed itself to the defence of the 
Kuomintang in Taiwan at the beginning of the 1950s. And from the late 
1950s, other larger processes were at work that would eventually deny 
the People's Liberation Army the prospect of a straightforward and low-
cost military victory even against the Kuomintang forces standing alone. 
Despite an impressive early start with reconstruction and nation 
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building, Mao Zedong's China lost the chance for rapid modernization 
and economic growth in the craggy heights of the Great Leap Forward 
and the swamps of the Cultural Revolution. Meanwhile the Kuomintang 
was putting together the elements of a new export-oriented development 
strategy which, in a quarter-century from the early 1960s, was to propel 
productivity and incomes in Taiwan close to the frontiers of the 
international economy. 
The Civil War history and the Taiwan administration's stronger 
economic and military position made Taiwan a more important 
reunification issue than Hong Kong to the Beijing leadership. 
Beijing's approach to reunification changed soon after the decisive 
political victory of the reformist coalition put together by Deng 
Xiaoping in December 1978. China's new policies of reform and 
opening to the outside world needed stability and peace. China needed 
co-operation with the West; and that would be helped greatly by the 
continuation of the role of Hong Kong as an efficient link to the 
international economy. These imperatives interacted with recognition of 
two realities of the environment for reunification: that there would be no 
early opportunity for the mainland to force its way into an unwilling 
Taiwan except at enormous cost; and that in the end Britain would settle 
for the best deal it could get for Hong Kong beyond 1997. 
These imperatives and realities were woven together in a bold new 
concept: the idea that one country, China, could operate with two 
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political and economic systems, a socialist system on the mainland and a 
capitalist system in Taiwan and Hong Kong. 
Restrictions on links with Taiwan were replaced by the 
encouragement of the 'three contacts' - contacts through exchanges of 
people, mail and communications, and trade. Older rhetoric about the 
liberation of Taiwan was replaced by calls for peaceful reunification 
through negotiation. The shelling of the offshore islands ceased. The 
new rhetoric carefully avoided, however, any final renunciation of the 
use of military force should all else fail. 
The Taiwan authorities reacted cautiously to this new approach. 
China needed, they said, not 'one country, two systems', but 'one 
country, one good system'. They rejected the call for 'three contacts' 
l 
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with an assertion of 'three nos': 'no contact, no negotiation, no 
compromise'. 
While these formal propositions have been unchanged since the 
early 1980s, there has been a substantial shift in the environment within 
which reunification has been contemplated on each side of the Straits. 
The increasing momentum of economic reform has been reducing 
systemic differences. Continued economic success has allowed Taiwan 
to establish itself as an entity with substantial weight in the international 
economy. Rapidly rising living standards in Taiwan have generated 
pressure for and underpinned a significant process of political 
liberalization. This has entailed some public questioning of established 
Kuomintang positions on contacts with the mainland and also on 
reunification. Economic change on both sides of the Straits has increased 
greatly the value of and therefore the pressures towards economic 
integration. 
Significant movements of goods and people across the Straits 
began, including investment through Hong Kong companies, all banned 
by the Taiwan authorities. And the pressures for democratization of 
authoritarian rule on Taiwan, which accompanied economic growth and 
rising living standards, began to encompass opposition to the economic 
and social costs of the Kuomintang's rejection of contacts. 
These pressures have been reflected in major changes in the 
Kuomintang's approach to contacts over the past ten months. The 
announcement last October by Chiang Kai-shek's son and successor, 
Chiang Ching-kuo, that visits to relatives on the mainland would be 
permissible for all but restricted categories of people on Taiwan, was 
followed by an explosion of interest in the mainland. Over the next nine 
months 200,000 people made the journey. Last year, travellers ran into 
Taiwan pilgrims at airports and hotels all over coastal China, at factories 
deep inland in Chongqing, and on tourist boats through the Yangtze 
Gorges. The Taiwanese found themselves observers of a world so 
changed - more ordered and prosperous than the China they had once 
known and than the China of the Kuomintang media, and much less 
prosperous than the China they now knew in Taiwan. 
Since the death of Chiang Ching-kuo early this year there has been 
no loss of momentum. The new leadership steered the Kuomintang 
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Congress to significant liberalization of trade with the mainland in May. 
Two-way trade, already valued at US$1.5 billion when still banned last 
year, is currently expanding rapidly under the combined influence of 
increasingly favourable underlying conditions, increased personal 
contact, and liberalization in Taiwan. Taiwan investment is also 
becoming rapidly more visible on the mainland. 
The mainland, for its part, has encouraged each of these 
developments with welcoming but low-key responses. Taiwan goods 
enjoy free trade with the mainland, in preference to foreign goods. But 
in the inimitable fashion of Chinese bureaucracy, free trade is (I was told 
by senior officers of Chinese e~terprises participating in the trade) 
modified by a tariff, lower than the foreign tariff, that brings prices up to 
the levels of mainland goods where the Taiwan products are 'too 
competitive'. Taiwan travellers and investors have received preferred 
treatment over foreign competitors. 
Pressures for and initial steps towards 'democratization' on Taiwan 
have increased momentum for more contact with the mainland, but also 
have led to questioning of the Kuomintang commitment to reunification. 
This has been accompanied by an important shift in the manner in which 
the Kuomintang itself talks of reunification. Increasingly the Taiwan 
leadership speaks as if it believes that 'one country, one good system' 
will emerge not from a military push to reclaim the mainland, but from 
Taiwan's demonstration of the superior achievements of its style of 
capitalism. Taiwan is paying close attention to the practical 
implementation of 'one country, two systems' in Hong Kong. 
The Hong Kong Experience 
Hong Kong is nervous and speculative. Any occasion for optimism or 
gloom is exaggerated in the retelling around Hong Kong and eventually 
finds its way into stock-market and real-estate values, and if it lasts long 
enough into investment and economic growth. The gloom has usually 
been strongest at any sign that Beijing was contemplating a change in 
the political status of Hong Kong, or itself undergoing political change 
that might affect Hong Kong. Hence the breaks in the powerful trend of 
growth, with short periods of absolute economic decline early and late in 
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the Cultural Revolution. Hence also the periods of panic on financial 
markets prior to the announcement of the Sino-British agreement in 
December 1984. (One such period of panic led to the pegging of the 
Hong Kong dollar to the US dollar as a stabilization device.) 
The Sino-British Joint Declaration established the principles under 
which Hong Kong was to be guaranteed the retention of a capitalist 
economic system for half a century after 1997. 
Whilst Hong Kong was to be restored to the sovereignty of 
China from 1July1997, the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region thereafter would enjoy a high degree of autonomy, 
except in foreign affairs and defence. 
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region would be 
vested with executive, legislative and independent judicial 
power, including that of final adjudication. Laws currently in 
force in Hong Kong would remain basically unchanged. 
The government would be composed of local inhabitants, and 
the Chief Executive appointed by the Chinese government on 
the basis of local elections or consultations. 
The legislature would be constituted through elections. It would 
enact laws and report them to China's National People's 
Congress. The laws would be valid if they were in accordance 
with the Basic Law that China had drawn up for Hong Kong's 
post-1997 administration. 
The current social and economic systems, education system, 
rights and freedoms and lifestyle in Hong Kong would remain 
unchanged. 
Hong Kong would remain fiscally separate from the mainland, 
with free trade and no foreign exchange control. 
These principles were to be embodied in the Basic Law, which 
would become the Constitution of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region. 
A draft of the Basic Law was released for public comment in April this 
year. The Draft Basic Law is an elaborate first attempt to give detailed 
expression to the principles of the Joint Declaration. It defines a 
13 
complex relationship and balance of power between the Chief Executive 
and the Legislature. As noted, there is a long list of rights which are to 
be preserved, a Hong Kong Bill of Rights. Several alternative formulas 
for direct and indirect elections to the legislature are put forward for 
discussion, although none approximating direct elections with universal 
suffrage. An attempt is made to protect from popular politics a number 
of features of established Hong Kong capitalism: for example, a 
requirement for balanced budgets. 
Hong Kong is a city of commerce, unaccustomed to debating fine 
points of constitutional law and political democracy. Many 
commentators have drawn attention to the low level of public interest in 
discussion of the Basic Law. Nevertheless, Hong Kong's economic 
development has spawned a substantial middle class, discussion within 
which has uncovered all of the usual dilemmas of constitution-making, 
and several unique to the Hong Kong environment. There is anxiety 
about whether the sources of real political power - in this case, the 
central authorities - will play by the rules. 
Beyond this fundamental question about a new constitution, the 
discussion has identified two paradoxes of the Hong Kong condition. 
One is that to preserve the system of rights and freedoms within which 
• Hong Kong operates, it is necessary to change fundamentally the legal 
basis of those rights. A literal reading of the law within which Hong 
Kong has prospered gives large, indeed, draconian powers to the 
colonial authorities. Hong Kong democrats have, through the current 
debate, come to identify the essence of individual liberties in Hong 
Kong as deriving from official restraint, which itself derives from ., 
British parliamentary democracy rather than any laws applicable in 
Hong Kong itself. Hence there has arisen the view that it is not enough 
for the current law to be maintained, but that a list of defined rights, and 
even direct elections to the legislature, are necessary to preserve the 
status quo in relations between the state and the individual. 
The second paradox is that to preserve Hong Kong's system as it 
currently exists requires the denial of tendencies to change and 
development that are inherent in the system itself. The natural evolution 
of Hong Kong as incomes and education levels rise, and with them a 
more numerous and self- confident middle class, probably entails greater 
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popular participation in and influence on economic and social policy- v 
making. 
Here there is tension within the politically aware Hong Kong 
community itself - between members of the business and administrative 
elite who fear that democratization would challenge the basis of laissez 
faire; and democrats who see promise in changes to the established 
fiscal and wider economic order. No final answers to this tension can 
emerge except through observation of the Hong Kong constitution in 
practice: certainly no answers that satisfy the whole of the political 
cognoscente. 
The people of Hong Kong have lived with high insecurity and 
uncertainty for half a century. There is a long tradition of successful 
Hong Kong business people buying insurance through investment 
abroad. Emigration of professionals, with internationally recognized 
tertiary qualifications, has always been part of the Hong Kong scene. 
The contemporary insecurity and uncertainty cannot compare with 
those times in the Cultural Revolution when hillsides of apartments were 
red with flags of the People's Republic, when traffic stopped before the 
tides of Red Guards, when threat and rumour of threat told of the 
imminent cutting of essential services from the mainland. At these times, 
Hong Kong stopped for a while, but survived, and went on to prosper as 
never before. 
But the people of Hong Kong have changed in the intervening 
years. Today, some members of a more numerous middle class, 
powering a more sophisticated economy, are rich and well educated 
enough to value abstract freedoms and democratic hopes above 
increments in material living standards. Many Chinese residents of Hong 
Kong are now well informed about opportunities abroad that were 
unknown and inaccessible to their parents' generation. Many more Hong 
Kong Chinese, with their greater wealth and education, now qualify 
within the less discriminatory immigration regimes of Canada and 
Australia. 
The outcome is unprecedented interest in emigration and, from 
what information can be pieced together, unprecedented rates of 
emigration. The rate at which 'Certificates of No Criminal Conviction' 
have been issued to people applying for immigration visas to recipient 
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countries has increased sharply, from around 20,000 per annum earlier 
in the 1980s, to 36,000 in 1986 and 52,000 in 1987. The number of 
Australian immigration visas issued rose sharply from 4,500 in 1985/86 
to 8,000 in 1987/88, making Hong Kong Australia's largest source of 
business migrants and third-largest source of all migrants. Canada is said 
to be issuing immigration visas at three times this rate. 
Emigrants are overwhelmingly economically successful 
professional and business people. These numbers are large in 
comparison with the stock of people from which they are drawn: in 
1986, only 300,000 people in Hong Kong had any form of tertiary 
qualification and a total of only 12,000 students were enrolled in Hong 
Kong's two universities. An acceleration of emigration from the current 
high rates, should the emigration turn out to be permanent and not 
simply the purchase of insurance, seriously could undermine Hong 
Kong's capacity to perform its economic role. 
Some Implications for the Future 
Economic growth in Hong Kong and Taiwan, and reform and the open 
policies on the mainland, have brought powerful new forces to play on 
the environment for reunification. 
Economic integration between Hong Kong and the mainland has 
advanced a long way since the Sino-British Declaration, to the great 
advantage of the prosperity of each. The resulting unprecedented 
prosperity in Hong Kong provides a valuable cement in holding the 
community together through the constitutional transition. 
There are powerful economic incentives for close integration of the 
Taiwan and mainland economies. These economic forces have played 
their part in the sculpting of attitudes in Taiwan to contact with the 
mainland. It is now likely that we will see the building of new towns, 
extensions of old towns and new dimensions of dynamism around the 
coast from Hong Kong to Shanghai - spurred by Taiwan capital, 
business leadership and trade. 
The full yield from economic integration can be won only within a 
durable stable political framework. 'One country, two systems' is a bold 
Chinese proposal for the resolution of what had appeared to be 
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irreconcilable differences over the future of Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
The Chinese and British governments have worked in good faith, and 
the Chinese intend to maintain the capitalist economy in Hong Kong for 
half a century beyond 1997. 
But even Hong Kong Chinese who share this confidence have 
concerns about whether existing institutions - subtle, complex, 
undefined and probably indefinable - will continue to work after the 
constitutional change. Hence the emigration, which could reduce the 
chances of success whatever the objective realities of constitutional 
succession. 
If things appear to be going well - if it looks likely that, without 
the Raj, the successful combination of firm, relatively honest, 
undemocratic enforcement of the rules of a laissez faire market economy 
and substantial social and economic freedom can be maintained - not all 
of the immigration visas will be used, and many former Hong Kong 
people will return to work holding a foreign nationality. In the end, the 
fate of one of the great constitutional innovations of modem times will 
be determined by the infinitely varied influences on the decisions of 
hundreds of thousands of Chinese individuals and families. 
Success in Hong Kong would change the map of political 
possibility in Taiwan. The Chinese Communist Party and the 
Kuomintang have lived with stalemate across the Straits for four 
decades. They can probably live with current ambiguities for a 
considerable while to come. 
But rapidly rising incomes and democratization in Taiwan and the 
sudden intensification of personal and economic contacts with the 
mainland will introduce their own eddies and cross-currents across the 
Straits. The ambiguities will require closer management And for as long 
as stalemate persists, there is some risk that sentiment for independence 
will lurch out of control. This is a point at which the government in 
Beijing might feel constrained to enter directly into the management of 
political life in Taiwan, whatever the cost 
I think that this is understood by leaders on both sides of the 
Straits, who might therefore calculate advantage in some nominal form 
of reunification that allowed life to proceed securely, separately and 
largely unchanged. The mainland has offered greater powers to a Taiwan 
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regional government than to Hong Kong, most importantly the power to 
maintain its own defence forces. With separate defence forces of 
considerable strength, Taiwan would be in a position to defend its 
separate system, while Hong Kong ultimately must rely on Beijing's 
word and will. 
A Taiwan loosely integrated with a rapidly developing China 
would have profound influence on the pattern of social and economic 
change in China, and this would amount to a different kind of guarantee. 
But most important of all will be all those decisions by Chinese in 
Hong Kong - the jury that is out on the case of 'One country, two 
systems'. 

